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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY RULE ON POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF FOR CLAIMS THAT PETITIONER RAISED AND LOST ON 
DIRECT APPEAL. 
In section II of the Appellee's Brief beginning on page sixteen, the State argues that 
all of the issues raised under Argument I of Petitioner's Brief were previously raised on 
direct appeal and that, therefore, these arguments are misplaced and are procedurally 
barred. However, this Court in Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006), adopted the 
ABA Guidelines for duties of post-conviction counsel. ABA Guideline 10.15.1(C)1 states: 
Post-conviction counsel should seek to litigate all issues, whether or not 
previously presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards 
applicable to high quality capital defense representation, including 
challenges to any overly restrictive procedural rules. Counsel should make 
The ABA Guidelines that were in effect at the time of the original trial in 1994 were attached as 
Addendum C to the Brief of the Appellant. However, at the time of this appeal and the Court's 
ruling in Menzies, the Court referred to the 2003 Guidelines. Therefore, counsel in this Reply Brief, 
as it effects current counsel's duties, will refer to the 2003 Guidelines. When referring to trial and 
appellate counsel's duties, Petitioner is referring to the 1989 Guidelines. 
every professionally appropriate effort to present issues in a manner that will 
preserve them for subsequent review. 
See, Addendum "A." 
In the commentary, the Guidelines state: 
As Subsection C emphasizes, it is of critical importance that counsel on 
direct appeal proceed, like all post-conviction counsel, in a manner that 
maximizes the client's ultimate chances of success. "Winnowing" issues in 
a capital appeal can have fatal consequences. Issues abandoned by 
counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in another case and 
ultimately successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed later. When a client 
will be killed if the case is lost, counsel should not let any possible ground for 
relief go unexplored or unexploited. 
In addition, the commentary of the Guidelines state: 
As with every other stage of capital proceedings, collateral counsel has a 
duty in accordance with Guideline 10.8 to raise and preserve all arguably 
meritorious issues. These include not only challenges to the conviction and 
sentence, but also issues which may arise subsequently. Collateral counsel 
should assume that any meritorious issue not contained in the initial 
application will be waived or procedurally defaulted in subsequent litigation, 
or barred by strict rules governing subsequent applications. Counsel should 
also be aware that any change in the availability of post-conviction relief may 
itself provide an issue for further litigation. This is especially true if the 
change occurred after the case was begun and could be argued to have 
affected strategic decisions along the way. 
Counsel understands that the Court in footnote 13 of Menzies stated: 
We do not read this guideline to require or encourage the litigation of issues 
that are clearly procedurally barred, although we recognize that whether an 
issue is so precluded must often be explored and raised by counsel. 
Current counsel has argued that the Court's decision to dismiss claim 8 of the 
Petition, denial of the right to a public trial by trying him inside the prison, has been laid out 
in detail with supporting law from a sister state which had to be presented at this point to 
give this Court the opportunity, if it so desires, to change its minority position to that of the 
majority position, i.e. that it is unconstitutionally prejudicial to try a defendant inside of a 
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prison or jail setting. 
This Court has stated before that it can revisit issues that have already been 
litigated and have been deemed procedurally barred. In Tillman v. Utah, 128 P.3d 1123 
(Utah 2005), this Court stated in paragraph 21: 
When evaluating a post-conviction claim for good cause, courts should 
generally decline to review a contention of error where the error "is 
something which is known or should have been known to the party," and 
therefore could have been raised at an earlier time. Brown v. Turner, 440 
P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968). "Nevertheless, howsoever desirable it may be 
to adhere to the rules, the law should not be so blind and unreasoning that 
where an injustice has resulted the victim should be without remedy." 
Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979); see also, Hurst v. Cook, 
111 P.2d at 1036 ("[l]t has long been our law that a procedural default is not 
always determinative of a collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged 
that the trial was not conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in 
harmony with constitutional standards."). Thus, even where an issue could 
have been raised in a previous post-conviction petition, post-conviction 
review may be available in those rare cases," Martinez, 602-P.2d at 702, or 
"unusual circumstances" where "an obvious injustice or a substantial and 
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has occurred" that would make it 
"unconscionable" not to reexamine the issue, Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1035; cf. 
Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832, 833 (Utah 1988) (declining to review a 
petition for post-conviction relief where the petitioner failed to show good 
cause for not raising the claim of constitutional error in a previous post-
conviction petition). 
Although not exactly on point, Petitioner believes this Court in Tillman was pointing out that 
there are unusual circumstances that would make it error or unconscionable not to 
reexamine the issue. Petitioner strongly urges the Court to reexamine this prison trial 
issue. 
Astoclaims9,10,11,13,14(a)and 15(b) of the Petition, Petitioner has pointed out 
that these were a violation of the then applicable ABA Guidelines as referenced in the 
Appellant's Brief. 
The State posits in its Brief that Petitioner had to make his "best showing" on his 
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burden of proving ineffective assistance and cited to the Court's decision in Brandt v. 
Springville Banking, 353 P.2d 460 (1960) that: 
summary judgment has a 'salutary purpose in our procedure because it 
eliminates the time, trouble and expense of trial when, upon best showing 
the plaintiff can make, he would not be entitled to a judgment.' 
Counsel did not put in the sentence before that statement which states: 
We are cognizant of the desirability of permitting litigants to fully present their 
case to the court, and though summary judgment prevents this, for that 
reason courts are and should be reluctant to invoke this remedy in 
commenting on the facts. Id. 
Most recently this Court cited Brandt in Barnes v. Sohio, 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981) 
and stated: 
Motions for summary judgment serve the salutary purpose of eliminating the 
time and expense of a trial when a party is entitled to relief on the law as 
applied to undisputed facts. 
There are disputed facts in this case and those have been pointed out. This Court 
also said in Barnes: 
Because the remedy is preemptory, a court in considering a motion for 
summary judgment must view the facts and the inferences from those facts 
in the light most favorable to the party moved against. (Citations omitted.) 
Id. 
As has been previously argued, the failure to meet the standards set by the ABA 
Guidelines is in and of itself ineffective assistance of counsel. See, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510(2003). 
The State in its Brief refers to the areas where present counsel showed that trial 
counsel failed to investigate the possible objections that could have been raised to the 
CUCF facility trial setting. (See Appellee's Brief, page 21.) Simply because there is no 
case law or controlling authority on these issues does not mean that they are not areas that 
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should not have been investigated and objections made thereon. Petitioner believes trial 
counsel missed arguments under the Utah Constitution open courts provision of Article I, 
§11 . 
The State cites State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 as to the proposition that the evidence 
produced must have been reasonably likely to have effected the outcome of his trial or 
appeal. Counsel feels that the State has cited Taylorlor a proposition that that case does 
not maintain. Page 687 of that case is a discussion as to whether Taylor's counsel should 
or should not have used mitigating evidence that was in Taylor's attorney's possession in 
the penalty phase of Taylor's trial. The court indicated that decision was a strategic 
decision. Petitioner believes that the holding in that case was contained in this paragraph: 
Taylor has not suggested a helpful strategy that would have been supported 
by evidence not known to Levine. Failure to investigate mitigating factors 
can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only where such factors 
actually exist and may be productively used in the penalty phase. Id. 
Therefore, the State's reliance on Taylor io support its argument that there was no 
evidence presented that could have been used at the guilt phase or at pretrial phases of 
this case is misplaced. See, State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 687 (Utah 1997). 
The State also has cited to State v. Gulbransen, 106 P.3d 734 (Utah 2005), as 
upholding its assertion the claims were not presented before the District Court. The 
holding in the Gulbransen is an issue where the nurse practitioner preserved some 
evidence, but that evidence was lost at the state crime lab. The defense did not allege bad 
faith under the Youngblood doctrine at the trial level. No evidence was submitted at the 
trial level as to the intention of the police officer or the state crime lab with regard to that 
evidence. This court then stated: 
[a]s a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised 
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on appeal. (Citations omitted.) We have further determined that the 
requirement of raising a claim at trial before bringing it on appeal "applies to 
every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." 
In this case, Gulbransen failed to raise his claim before the district court and 
is thereby barred from making such a claim before us. 
Clearly, Petitioner's claims were made at the district court level, so the State's 
reliance on "no argument of plain error or exceptional circumstances" does not defeat the 
claims that have been presented to the trial court and the summary judgment issued 
thereon. Therefore, the State's reliance on Taylor is misplaced. 
II. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL SHOULD 
HAVE CHALLENGED THE DEATH QUALIFICATION PROCESS OR THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINITIONS. 
Counsel again in its Brief refers to the Gulbransen case, and again relies on a 
misplaced reading of that case. Counsel did not have to allege plain error or exceptional 
circumstances under Gulbransen to preserve those issues here. 
The State then refers this Court to Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, and refers to 
paragraph 49 of that decision wherein the court states: 
while Lafferty does raise a number of issues that were not raised on direct 
appeal, he fails to show how appellate counsel's failure to raise them on 
direct appeal amounted to constitutionally deficient performance. Lafferty 
assumes that the omission fo these claims constitutes "the very kernel of 
ineffective assistance of counsel: had prior counsel actually provided 
effective assistance, then these claims would have been brought on direct 
appeal." These assertions misconstrue the premise of our ineffective 
assistance of counsel standard. Appellate counsel is not obligated to raise 
"every non-frivolous issue on appeal . . . [and may] 'winnow out' weaker 
claims in order to focus effectively on those more likely to prevail." Carter 
2001 UT 96, H 48 (quoting Banks, 54 F.3d at 1515). 
This is in direct contradiction to what the ABA Guidelines have stated in 10.15.1. 
See, Addendum A. The direction given in the Guidelines commentary indicates that: 
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'Winnowing' issues in a capital appeal can have fatal consequences. Issues 
abandoned by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in another 
case and ultimately successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed later. 
Therefore, Petitioner does not feel that this is a set of arguments on these two 
claims that can be "winnowed" and that the trial court should have allowed evidence to be 
heard thereon. 
III. PETITIONER'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO SEEK 
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF AN ISSUE THAT PETITIONER LATER LOST ON 
PLENARY APPEAL 
Counsel disagrees with the State that the burden is to show the best showing and 
that the burden shifted to Kell on summary judgment on this or any other issue. See, 
Argument I, Id. The burden for summary judgment is on the State, not on Petitioner. 
IV. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENTS ON PETITIONER'S REMAINING CLAIMS. 
Counsel incorporates by reference all the arguments in Petitioner's Argument I 
supra. 
Additionally, counsel for the State indicates that a mere failure to comply with ABA 
Guidelines will not demonstrate deficient performance and cites the Court to Menzies v. 
Ga/ef/ca, 150 P.3d 480 at fl 90 (Utah 2006). Counsel does not believe that Menzies stands 
for that proposition. In fact, it is apparent that Menzies stood for the opposite proposition, 
that post-conviction counsel must meet the post-conviction guidelines set out by the ABA 
Guidelines. ("Because Utah's post-conviction rules do not currently contain any provisions 
regarding counsel's performance in post-conviction death penalty proceedings, and 
because it is traditionally the duty of the courts to supervise the performance of counsel, 
we rely on the ABA Death Penalty guidelines to the extent that they are relevant to our 
decision.") See, Menzies at f[ 90. 
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In fact, the United States Supreme Court has held that the ABA Guidelines are a 
minimum standard by which death penalty cases shall be judged when ineffective 
assistance of counsel issues are raised. In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
Counsel's conduct similarly fell short of the standards for capital defense 
work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) - - standards to 
which we long have referred as "guides to determining what is reasonable." 
Strickland, supra, at 688; Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 396. 
The State has long and consistently fought against the applications of these 
standards. Petitioner feels that if the State is so concerned about these Guidelines, that 
it must agree that trial and appellate counsel fell below those standards. However, the 
State also seems to argue that trial counsel and appellate counsel did not fall below those 
standards. Petitioner would request that the Court adopt the trial and appellate ABA 
Guidelines for its standards as it has in the post-conviction arena. If this Court feels that 
those standards have been met by trial counsel, then the issue is moot as the State 
contends. If trial and appellate counsel have not met those standards, then this case 
should be remanded back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on those failures. 
V. OBJECTION TO CASE STATEMENT 
The State in its case statement on pages 3 through 9 fails to comport to the Utah 
R. App. P., Rule 24(a)(7). Rule 24(a)(7) A Statement of the Case, in relevant part states: 
"The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of the 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review shall follow. . ." 
The State's case statement is merely a parade of terribles of issues that were 
presented during the trial and during the penalty phase, but are not a statement of the 
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course of these proceedings. These statements are not an indication of the disposition in 
the court below, nor are the statements of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review on the motions for dismissal on summary judgment. The State's case statement 
is merely an attempt to inflame this court against the petitioner. It is not disputed by the 
petitioner that this is the testimony that was presented. It is disputed by the petitioner that 
it is not relevant under the Rules for the purpose of enlightening the Court as to the nature 
of the case in a procedural way. 
The mark of a civilized country is how it treats its most uncivilized citizens. Utah has 
put these post-conviction procedures in place to protect the rights of those who are 
sentenced to die. The petitioner objects to the State's gratuitous use of these inflammatory 
statements when they have no relevance to the Appellate Rules. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the trial court erred in dismissing and granting summary judgment on 
all of the Petitioner's claims in his Writ and the case should be remanded back to the trial 
court for an evidentiary hearing on all issues. 
DATED this 7- day of March, 2008. / 
/Apfc Cramer 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on this I ^ day of March, 2008, I sent by first-class mail, 
postage-prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above Reply Brief to the following parties: 
Thomas B. Brunker 
Christopher D. Ballard 
Attorney General's Office 
130 East 600 South, 6th Fioor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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ADDENDUM A 
DPGiflDEUNES42003.DOC KV2K2003 fcl$ AM 
2003] ABA GUIDELINES 1079 
GUIDELINE lft.15.1—DUTIES OF POST-CONVICTION 
COUNSEL 
A* Counsel representing a capital client at any point 
after conviction shock! be familiar with the 
jurisdiction's procedures for setting execution dates 
and providing notice of then. Post-conviction 
counsel should also be thoroughly familiar with afl 
available procedures for seeking a stay of execution. 
B. tf an execution date is set, post-conviction counsel 
should immediately take all appropriate steps to 
secure a slay of execution and pursue those efforts 
through all available fora* 
C Ptett-connrtetioncounsdshouddseekto 
issues, whether or not previously presented, that are 
arguably meritorious under the standards applicable 
to high quality capital defease representation, 
including challenges to any overly restrictive 
procedural rales. Counsel should make every 
professionally appropriate effort to present issues in 
a manner that wiB preserve them for subsequent 
review. 
D. The duties of the counsel representing the client on 
direct appeal should include fiing a petition for 
certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
If appellate counsel docs not intend to file such a 
petition, he or she should immediately notify 
successor counsel if known and the Responsible 
Agency. 
E. Post-conviction counsd shonH fefy 
ongoing obligations imposed by these Guidelines, 
including the obligations to: 
1. maintain dose contact with the cfient regarding 
litigation developments; and 
DPGUDEUMBS420Q3JXX: 1(V2<V20038:1SAM 
1080 HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW [YoL 31:913 
2. continually monitor the client's mental, physical 
and emotional condition for effects on the client's 
legal position; 
3. keep under continuing review the desirability of 
modifying prior counseTi theory of the case in 
light of snbseqneat developments; and 
4. continue an aggressive investigation of alii aspects 
of the case. 
History of Guideline 
This Guideline is based cm Guideline 1 L9.3 of the original edition. 
Subsections A, B, and D are entirely new. Subsection C includes new 
language regarding the manna* in which post-conviction counsel must 
present sill arguably meritorious issues. Subsection E includes new 
language emphasizing die ongoing obligations imposed by these 
Guidelines upon post-conviction counsel. 
Related Standards 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION 
Standard 4-8.5 ("Post-convicticm Remedies") in ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
(3d ed 1993). 
Commentary 
Almost all of the duties imposed by Guidelines 10.3 et seq. are 
applicable in the post-conviction context. Subsection E notes this by way 
of reminder. Post-conviction counsel should ccxisult those Guidelines 
and accompanying commentaries. 
DPGl*DElJNES42063j>OC 10002003 fclS AM 
2003] ABA GUIDELINES 1081 
The Paramount Duty to Obtain a Stay 
No matter how compelling the client's post-conviction case may 
be, he faces the risk that his execution will moot it332 This is a 
phenomenon unique to capital litigation and one that must be uppermost 
in the mind of post-Kxmviction counsel 
When states fail to provide posi-conviction counsel entirely or in a 
timely manner,333 or request the setting of an execution date to advance 
the litigation,334 or impose short periods of time for filing substantive 
post-judgment pleadings, the result is emergency requests for stays of 
execution so that substantive pleadings will be considered335 Although 
332. Sfe« Brooks v.Esteflc 702 F^dW,S4-S5(5diCir. 19S3) (dismtssmg appeal, which h ^ 
recdved certificate tfproM 
followitigtfaedefiialofaatB^ 1982)). 
333. There has been no right to stale post<convk^kiii o o o ^ ai Georgk. S ^ Gibaon v. T i ^ ^ 
513S.EJ2d 186, 188 (Ga. 1999). In August 1996, Georgia Supreme Coort Jbutax Robert Benham 
noted that several persons under sentence of death in Georgia were in "immediate need of legal 
lqwcaentaikxC and asked area law firms to vohmteer BflJ Rankin, When Death Raw hwnaki Go 
To Com Without Lawyers: ht the Late Stages of Their Fight to Stay Alive, Some Aou* Represent 
Themselves, ATLANTA JL A CONST., Dec 29, 1996, at D5 (internal quotation marks oauttedX One 
Atlanta civil firm that volunteered was assigned the case of Marcus Wettons. See kL Three days 
after the firm received a copy of the trial transcript, the trial court set an execution dale for two 
weeks later. See id The firm rushed to the Georgia Supreme Coort and asked for more time to 
submit a formal post-conviction petition. See id Hoars before Mr. Weuons's *^r4nlrd execution, 
the Court denied the request by a 4-3 vote. See id As guards were about to shave Mr Weuons's 
head for that evening's electrocution, the federal district coort granted a stay of execution. See id 
State counsel and the federal defender were given ten moians to prepare tte 
A similar instance of legal Russian roulette took place in Alabama in 2001 in the case of 
Thomas D. Arthur. See Armor v. rfeley, 24«FJd 13(^(1 ImCir. 20t)l) (afBrmmgpm* of amy on 
day before scheduled execution to inmate who had been unrepresented for more than two years 
following direct appeal); Agency Chims Death Row Inmates Without Lawyen a G 
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, March 26,2001, at B8 (describing Arthur case and absence of 
any state funding for postconviction representation m Alabama). As «"BB*«H supra note 47, 
counsel should be aggressive m challenging such invsnrawfliie behaviuf by the states as a federal 
constitutional violation. 
334. For example, in Kentucky capital cases the Attorney General invariably requests an 
execution date at me end of direct appeal, and the Governor kwariably signs the death warrant No 
stay of execution may be granted until the state postconviction p e t i ^ 
to obtam a stay, counsel must often file a state 
under state law because mere is an outstanding execution date. The practice is the same in federal 
habeas proceedings. See, *&, Execution ofKiBer Ddayea\ CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 9,2000, at 
DIB. 
335. When a capital case enters a phase of being "under warranT--i.e^ when a death warrant 
has been signed—time comautraents for counsel increase, "due in lame part to the necessary 
duplicatJon of effort in toe preparation of several petitions which might have to be filed 
stmuitaneousty as d&erent courts." ABA POST-Cowvarnow DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION 
PROJECT ET AU, TIME AM> EXPENSE ANALYSIS M POSTCONVICTION DEATH PENALTY CASES 10 
(1987). 
DPGUffiCLBffiS*2003j)OC 10802003 8:18 AM 
1082 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:913 
the ABA and other professional voices have repeatedly condemned this 
system,336 defense counsel must make the best of it—by seeking stays or 
reprieves from any available source and challenging the; unfairness of 
any overly restrictive constraints cm the filing of substantive pleadings 
and/or stays. 
And to the extent that counsel can responsibly reduce the stresses 
imposed upon the client by this often nightmarish system, counsel 
should of course do so (e.g., by reassuring the client of the unlikelihood 
of the execution actually occurring on hs nominal date, notwithstanding 
the alarming preparations being made by the prison).337 
Keeping the Client Whole 
Even if their executions have been safely stayed, however, the 
mental condition of many capital clients will deteriorate the longer they 
remain on death row. This may result in suicidal tendencies and/or 
impairments in realistic perception and rational decisionmaking.33* 
Counsel should seek to minimize this rid: by staying in close contact 
with the client339 
336. See ABA C K B O N A L JUSTICE SECTION, saprn note 86, * 10-11 (cifling for automatic 
federal slays throughout postconviction period); Legislative Medication, smpra note 12, s i 855 
("We agree with the P r o d i Committee [appointed by Chief Justice Refawpnst lo study reform of 
capital habeas corpus] that the current mechanisms for obtaining stays of execution are irrational 
and indefensible At best, they lead to an enormous waste o f legal effort by all participants in the 
system, and at worst they result in inconsistencies that have fatal consequenocs."); Ira P. Robbms, 
Justice by At fitmbers: The Sa)aia* CamrtamdAeRtde€fFam'-OrisitFhfe?>y6Suf¥.V.h. 
REV. 1 (2002); Eric M Freedman, Can Malice Be Served tyAppeab of the Detuff,KArhLJ.,OcL 
19,1992, at 13 (current stoaation respecting stays is ^ V 4 a w to ran a judicial system"). 
337. See, e.g., McDonald v. Missouri, 464 U S 1306, 1307 (1984) (Btackmun, J., in 
chambers). 
(I thought I had advised the Supreme Court of Missoun onoe before, in Williams, that 
. A . shall stay the execution o f any Missouri applicant whose direct review of his 
conviction and death scHsncr is being sought and has not been completed. I repeat the 
admonition to the Supreme Court ofMissouri, and to any o f f i c e wirhm tie 
of responsibility, that I shall continue that practice. The stay, of course, ought to be 
granted by the state tribunal in the first Mwlatar, but, if it foils to fulfill its responsibility, 
1 shaU Eurfill nunc.) 
Williams v. Missouri, 463 U S 1301, 1301-02 (1983) (Blackmun, J., m chambers) (executions 
scheduled fcr prior to the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari on direct appeal must be 
stayed "as a natter of course"). 
338 SeeC.\xeVbMim0oto,AC\mwmntyDmd& 
Rom Vohmktermg, 25 L A W & Soc . lNQUBtY 849, 850 (2000) (noting that **[b]etwecn 1977 and 
March 1998, 59 [condemned] inmates had volunteered for execution compmed to 382 executed 
unwittingly"); see also mfina note 351. 
339, See smprtx text accoaanaflying notes 1S9-92 
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Counsel's ongoing monitoring of the client's status, required by 
Subsection E(2), also has a strictly legal purpose. As described supra in 
the text accompmying notes 188-92, a worsening in the client's mental 
condition may directly affect the legal posture of the case and the lawyer 
needs to be aware of developments. For example, the case establishing 
the proposition that insane persons cannot be executed340 was heavily 
based on notes on the client's mental status that counsel had kept over a 
period of months. 
The Labvrinfe of Post-convietion Litigation 
A. The Direct Appeal 
Practice varies among jurisdictions as to the limits of the appellate 
process and the relationship between direct appeals and collateral post-
conviction challenges to a conviction or sentence.341 Issues that are only 
partially or minimally reflected by the record, or thai are outside the 
record, should be explored by appellate counsel as a predicate for 
informed decisionmaking about legal strategy. 
As Subsection C emphasizes, it is of critical importance that 
counsel on direct appeal proceed, like all post-conviction counsel, in a 
manner that maximizes the client's ultimate chances of success. 
"Winnowing" issues in a capital appeal can have fatal consequences. 
Issues abandoned by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in 
another case and ultimately successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed 
later.342 When a client will be killed if the case is lost, counsel should not 
let any possible ground for relief go unexplored or unexplohed.343 
340. See Ford v WaarrwnghL, 477 US.399 ,402 (1986> 
341. In some states, there is a unitary appeal system in which direct appeal and collateral 
challenges such as ineffective assistance of counsel chums are raised sanuhaneousiy. See, e.g., 
IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (Michie Supp. 2002). In other jurisdictions, ineffective assistance of 
counsel chums generally any not be raised on direct appeal but are reserved for separate post-
conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State, 691 So. 2d 1068,1074 (Fb. 1997) (explaining 
that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal> The federal 
system follows me tatter rule. See Massaro v. United Stales* 123 S. & 
342. For e i a a ^ as d e s e r t safTOmar^ 
Supreme Court declined to address the merits of a petitioner's claim that his Fifth Amendment 
rights were violated by the testimony of a psychiatrist who had cammed the defendant without 
warrmig him that the i n t e r r ^ 
assert this damn on direct appeal because me Virginia Supreme Court had rejected such claims at 
that tape. See id. at 531. The Supreme O a a t w f r B c y ^ ^ 
EsieOe v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). m a uCatch-2T for the defendant, the Court conchjded 
npTfrlhtrnrnrrrHrrarrrrrf in fTrHi i r fnTMnrthr"rrnrrnff nf *Trmnmrin|nut m • ! i Tgiaaiuti IWI 
appeal and focusing on* those more likely to prerafl, fir from bong CFaleuuc of • ^ T - ' H W T . B 
DPGuroeLD«s*2003jxx: 100000038:1* AM 
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Appellate counsel must be familiar with the deadlines for filing 
petitions for state and federal post-conviction relief and how they are 
affected by the direct appeal. If the conviction and sentence are affirmed, 
appellate counsel should ordinarily file on the client's behalf a petition 
for certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court Under the 
AEDPA, a client's one-year statute of limitations for filing a petition for 
federal habeas corpus relief generally begins to run upon the denial of 
certiorari or when the 90 days for filing a petition lias elapsed344 
Appellate: counsel should therefore immediately inform successor 
counsel if he or she does not intend to file a petition for certiorari or 
when a petition for is denied; if successor counsel is not yet appointed, 
counsel should promptly advise the Responsible Agency of the need to 
designate successor counsel (Subsection D). 
Appellate counsel should also advise the client directly of all 
applicable deadlines for seeking post-conviction relief and explain the 
tolling provisions of the AEDPA,345 emphasizing thai a state post* 
conviction motion should be filed sufficiently in advance of die one-year 
deadline to allow adequate time to prepare a federal habeas corpus 
petition. In states in which the direct appeal and state posNx>nviction 
review aie conducted in tandem,346 post-conviction proceedings may be 
concluded at the same time as, or even before, the direct appeal, 
effectively rendering the tolling provisions inapplicable. 
In light of this mutual dependency among all the ]x>st-conviction 
legal procedures, it is of the utmost importance that, in accordance with 
Guideline 10.13, appellate counsel cooperate fully with successor 
counsel and turn over all relevant files promptly. 
the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy." Murray, ATI U.S. at 536 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)). At the same time, the cbmn was not deemed sufficiently novel to 
constitute ause for the procedural defiant because "forms of the ckum he [advanced] had been 
percolating rn the lower coats for years at the ame of fats original appeal" Mmruy, ATI U.S. at 
536-37. Mr. Smith was therefore barred from raising the issue m federal habeas proceedings, id. at 
539, and was executed. 
343. It is for this reason mat Subsection C refers to "issues... mat are arguably meritDrious 
under the standards apphcable to high quality capital defense representation." See supra Guideline 
10.8, text accompanying notes 234-36; see also supra text accompanying note 28. For examples of 
such issues, see supra notes 231,271,276,307, and a*m note 352. 
344. 2SUSC §2244<dXlXA)(2000);^Ln^^ 
345. & r C ^ v. United States, 123 S.Ct 1042 (2XB\ 
346. See* e.g.y CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT POLICIES 
REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENTS OF DEATH 3 (2002) (petitions for writ of habeas 
corpus to be fBed within 180 days of final doe date for filing reply brief on direct appeal); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN DL 22, § 1089(DXl)(West Sopp 2003)(inotm&^ 
ivr^JliAIUJ O . I O A M 
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B. Collateral Relief—State and Federal 
As described in the commentary to Guideline 1.1, providing high 
quality legal representation in collateral review proceedings in capital 
cases requires enormous amounts of time, energy, and knowledge. The 
field is increasingly complex and ever-changing. As state and federal 
collateral proceedings become ever-more intertwined, counsel 
representing a capital client in state collateral proceedings must become 
intimately familiar with federal habeas corpus procedures. As indicated 
above, for example, although the AEDPA deals strictly with cases being 
litigated in federal court, its statute of limitations provision creates a 
de facto statute of limitations for filing a collateral review petition in 
state court Some state collateral counsel have foiled to understand the 
AEDPA's implications, and unwittingly forfeited their client's right to 
federal habeas corpus review.347 
Collateral counsel has the same obligation as trial and appellate 
counsel to establish a relationship of trust with the client But by the time 
a case readies this stage, the client will have put his life into the hands of 
at least (me other lawyer and found himself cm death row. Counsel 
should not be surprised if the client initially exhibits some hostility and 
lack of trust, and must endeavor to overcome these barriers. 
Ultimately, winning collateral relief in capital cases will require 
changing the picture that has previously been presented. The old facts 
and legal arguments—those which resulted in a conviction and 
imposition of the ultimate punishment, both affirmed on appeal—are 
unlikely to motivate a collateral court to make the effort required to stop 
the momentum the case has already gained in rolling through the legal 
system.348 Because an appreciable portion of the task of post-conviction 
counsel is to change the overall picture of the case, Subsection E(3) 
requires that they keep under continuing review the desirability of 
amending the defense theory of the case, whether one has been 
formulated by prior counsel in accordance with Guideline 10.10.1 or not 
For similar reasons, collateral counsel cannot rely on the previously 
compiled record but must conduct a thorough, independent investigation 
347. See generally, Goodman v. Johnson, No. 99-20452 (5th Cir. Sept 19, 1999) 
(unpublished); Cantu-Tzm v. Johnson, 162 F 3d 295 (5th Cir 1998). Spencer Goodman was 
executed by Texas in January 2000 and Andrew Canto-Tzm was executed by Texas in January 
1999. 
348 S ^ genera^, RiBseUStea^,P^ 
CHAMPION, Aug. 1999, available at h1tp://www.cniiima^^ 
ug06Y. 
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in accordance with Guideline 10.7. (Subsection E(4)). As demonstrated 
by the high percentage of reversals and disturbingly large number of 
innocent persons sentenced to death, the trial record is unlikely to 
provide either a complete or accurate picture of the facts and issues in 
the case.349 That may be because of information concealed by the state, 
because of witnesses who did not appear at trial or who testified falsely, 
because the trial attorney did not conduct an adequate investigation in 
the first instance, because new developments show the inadequacies of 
prior forensic evidence, because of juror misconduct, or for a variety of 
other reasons. 
Two parallel tracks of post-conviction investigation are required. 
One involves reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the 
client Reinvestigating the case means examining the facts underlying 
the conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's 
performance, judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct Reinvestigating 
the client means assembling a more-thorough biography of the client 
than was known at the time of trial, not only to discover mitigation that 
was not presented previously, but also to identity mental-health claims 
which potentially reach beyond sentencing issues tot fundamental 
questions of competency and mental-state defeases. 
As with every other stage of capital proceedings, collateral counsel 
has a duty in accordance with Guideline 10.8 to raise and preserve all 
arguably meritorious issues.350 These include not only challenges to die 
conviction and sentence, but also issues which may arise 
subsequently.351 Collateral counsel should assume that any meritorious 
issue not contained in the initial application will be waived or 
procedurally defaulted in subsequent litigation, or barred by strict rules 
governing subsequent applications.352 Counsel should also be aware that 
349. See supra text accompanying notes 47-58. 
350. See supra Guideline 10.8 and accompanying commentary. As Subsection C emphasizes, 
the duty to investigate and present such claims applies to "all issues, whether or not previously 
presented" Until previously unpresented issues are fully explored, there is no way to determine 
whether or not any arguably applicable forfeiture doctrines may be overcome. See House v. Bell, 
311 F 3d 767 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert denied, 123 S. Ct 2575 (2003) (certifying to state 
courts issue of whether procedural vehicle existed to present evidence of mnocence first uncovered 
during federal habeas proceedings) 
351. For example, although the Justices disagree on the point, as shown most recently by their 
varying op«Jons respectmg the ccrtioran pe 123 S. Ct 470 (2002), it may 
well be that after a certam length of tome coiatminrt cojiiiiriwirt on death row ripens into an Eighth 
Arrierjdment violation. 
352 See Mason v. Meyers, 208 FJd 414,417 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating tint as a result of the 
strict ruks gjovermng successive habeas corpus petitions enacted by the AEDPA and codified at 28 
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any change in the availability of post-conviction relief may itself provide 
an issue for fiirther litigation.353 This is especially true if the change 
occurred after the case was begun and could be argued to have affected 
strategic decisions along the way. 
U S . C . §2244(b), "it is essential thai habeas petitioners include m their first petition cdl potential 
claims for which they wt£& desire to sock review and relief). 
353. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997) (discussing the retroactive 
application of various procedural provisions in the AEDPA to pending cases). 
